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ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY AND
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Summary of Presentations
JOHN

H.

JACKSON*, JULIUS

L.

KATZ**, HUGO PAEMEN***,

AND ALAN WM. WOLFF****

I. Success of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Moderator John H. Jackson opened the roundtable by asking the panelists
whether they agree with the general proposition that the dispute settlement system
has been a success so far. He also asked whether there was one issue that each
panelist would focus on in evaluating the performance of the system.
Julius L. Katz commented that the view that the system has succeeded so far
appears to be unanimous. However, one must ask whether the system will be a
victim of its own success and suffer from case overload. Many have spoken
about the serious issue of strains on the system. The current caseload, however,
may be the result of pent-up demand. Once that demand is satisfied, perhaps,
the load will be reduced.
Katz also observed that there are no substantive negotiations currently underway. In the past, substantive negotiations have provided a venue for problem
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solving. The absence of substantive negotiations now may be a source of additional
strain.
Katz identified the additional problem that every dispute has been heard twice,
once by a panel and once by the Appellate Body. During the Uruguay Round,
Katz raised the issue of whether this double hearing would, in fact, transpire.
Some argued that it would never happen, because the Appellate Body would hear
only questions of law. However, experience has demonstrated otherwise. Katz
suggested that one way to address the double-hearing inefficiency problem may
be to change the makeup of panels. Another idea would be to make it more
difficult to go to the Appellate Body by, for instance, making the appealing parties
pay.
Alan Wm. Wolff commented that the most important question concerning the
dispute settlement system is its political sustainability. During the Uruguay
Round, the negotiating parties understood that they were trading unilateralism
for a multilateral approach to trade disputes. The question now is whether the
system is equal to the challenge before it.
Wolff agreed with Grant Aldonas that having good dispute settlement rules
in place is no substitute for good substantive rules. The absence of rules poses
major problems of proof. We have seen this with Japan and are likely to see it
with China.
Wolff stated that, from the U.S. perspective, if there is an inability to negotiate,
an apparent inability to retaliate, and no possibility to litigate (without comprehensive rules in place), then the system is defective. Thus, there is a need for new
rules. Developing such rules will not be easy. Cases involving private restraints
of trade, for instance, will be difficult.
Wolff commented that enhancing transparency is an important goal. Further,
a standing judiciary is essential for continuity. He also urged greater private
sector participation in dispute settlement.
Wolff argued that if more resources are made available to developing countries,
then more resources must also be made available to developed countries with
high case loads. The defending party always has an advantage with respect to
the facts, because the expertise of the bureaucratic agency that has blocked imports
can be brought to bear during the dispute settlement process. By contrast, the
private interests within the complaining country that seek to have obstacles to
free trade lifted are usually not represented in the process. This should be changed
(i.e., there should be greater participation by private interests).
Wolff stated that independent review of dispute settlements by a national body,
as proposed in the so-called Dole Amendment, would be a good way to evaluate
the adequacy of the dispute settlement process from a domestic point of view.
Addressing the Japan-Filmcase, Wolff stated that although this was technically a loss for the United States, Japan, in defending itself, made admissions
that it might not have made if the matter had not been brought before the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Therefore, the dispute may not have been a total
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loss for the United States. In sum, Wolff stated that the WTO members must
negotiate new substantive rules to ensure that goods can be traded in open markets
once they cross borders. Also, the WTO members should put a permanent judiciary in place to ensure that those rules are enforced.
Hugo Paemen stated that the European view is that the system has worked
well. It has been used frequently and has resulted in some clear resolutions of
disputes. Five to six years ago, the system as it is now was unimaginable. It was
courageous of the United States to accept multilateral dispute settlement. On the
other hand, many Europeans were comfortable with the weaknesses of the old
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and it was courageous of them
to accept the element of automaticity in the system as it now exists. However,
it is still too early to reach a final opinion on the success of the new dispute
settlement system.
Paemen stated that, for traditional trade disputes, the system has worked well.
However, in cases at the intersection between traditional trade matters and domestic policy (i.e., cases dealing with the environment, health and safety, and national
security) the record of the new system has been mixed. Japan-Filmand EUBeef Hormones are illustrations of problems at this intersection.
Referring to the Appellate Body's EU-BeefHormones decision, Paemen stated
that the WTO should not be a standards-setting body. Rather, it must incorporate
standards set by other bodies. He commented that, in the future, a number of
alternatives were open to the WTO. It might try to take a more active regulatory
approach, or, it might take a more low-key approach and it might follow the
rules set by other international bodies. A better approach would be to discuss
openly the issues that arise at the intersection between trade law and domestic
policy, such as trade and the environment and trade and competition policy. The
WTO should take these issues up as soon as possible, rather than be confronted
by them in a crisis.

II. Constraints on the System and the Creation of New Substantive Rules
Jackson then commented that there is a tension between the constraints within
the WTO Charter and the Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), on the one hand, and the desire to create new
substantive rules on the other. It is difficult to create new substantive rules through
negotiation. Therefore, there is a temptation to push the limits of the DSU rather
than negotiate new substantive rules. Jackson asked the panelists whether this
tension suggests that the WTO has a fatal flaw.
Katz responded that part of the problem is the current absence of a negotiating
round. It is difficult to deal with issues on a one-by-one basis. There is a better
chance of solving problems when they are part of a larger package.
Wolff commented that there will be a demand for deeper integration within
the WTO. Market forces are leading that way. For instance, there is a need to
FALL 1998
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deal with the problem of state-owned enterprises. In addressing these issues now,
we need to understand how to apply existing rules successfully.
Paemen commented that overall, there is a need for greater cooperation between
the WTO and other international organizations, dealing for example with environmental or labor policy.
Steve Charnovitz suggested that there may be a third option between negotiating
new substantive rules and pushing the limits of the dispute settlement mechanism.
That option is to enhance linkages between the WTO and other international
organizations and non-governmental organizations.
III. Integration of Government-to-Government Disputes into the System
Tom Brewer commented that, in the area of investment protection, there already
exists a massive network of rules and dispute settlement procedures at various
levels of government. Dispute settlement outside of the WTO includes investor-togovernment disputes, as well as government-to-government disputes. He asked
the panelists to comment on the proposal that government-to-government investment dispute settlement procedures be integrated into the WTO, but that investorto-government dispute settlement procedures be kept outside the WTO.
Wolff agreed with Brewer's proposition. He added that governments should
be required to give an explicit warranty of market access with respect to investment
and competition policy, once goods and services have gotten across the border.
In responding to Jackson's question about what he meant by a "warranty," Wolff
said that, with respect to market-restricting actions by private entities, a warranty
would require a government to pay compensation if, for instance, a cartel were
in place and the government took no action to break it up. This would be an
extension of article XXIII of the GATT 1994. The parties would have to achieve
this goal through negotiations, since a warranty would apply to all conditions of
domestic regulation.
Paemen then commented that dispute settlement within the WTO happens
between governments. During negotiations in the Uruguay Round, there was a
general sentiment that private parties should not be allowed to participate. Paemen
stated that he favors a greater degree of openness, but not actual private party
participation in WTO dispute settlement.
Katz responded that a warranty sounded sensible. However, he questioned
whether such a concept could be reconciled with the idea that competition policy
should not be brought within the WTO. The WTO can't have rules that address
private party conduct without having substantive rules on competition policy.
He believes that it will be a long time before the WTO develops rules on competition policy.
Responding to Brewer's question, Katz stated that investment rules should be
brought within the WTO, and the sooner the better. He hoped that efforts within
the WTO would be more successful than efforts to agree to an Multilateral
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the Organization for Economic Control
and Development (OECD). He observed that bringing investment protection
within the WTO could even include the handling of investor-host state disputes
within the dispute settlement system.
IV. Establishing a Professional Judiciary
Robert Hudec commented that the WTO Secretariat has indicated that, given the
difficulties encountered in appointing a professional Appellate Body, it would not
want to tackle the establishment of a professional judiciary. Setting up such ajudiciary would involve lots of "horse trading," with each country insisting that its
own candidates be represented. He asked the panelists to comment on how national
governments are likely to react to the creation of permanent panels or making the
Appellate Body a more permanent and professional body than it is today.
Katz stated that the United States probably would be the first country to express
anxiety over the creation of a professional WTO judiciary. Given the concerns
expressed over loss of sovereignty during the Uruguay Round, Katz was skeptical
that a professional WTO judiciary would get much support in the United States.
It may be a good idea, but its promoters would have to educate a lot of policymakers first.
Paemen commented that, in discussing the option of creating a professional
judiciary, we must consider where we have come from. He observed that the
WTO is well on its way to keeping politics out of the dispute settlement system.
He noted that it is impressive how easily the Europeans and Americans have
accepted decisions by WTO panels. Given how much has been achieved thus
far, Paemen was skeptical as to whether there is much to be gained from attempting
to go further. The WTO should not diverge too much from what the GATT was:
a place where parties come to solve problems, and, to that end, the consultation
phase of dispute settlement remains very important. Dispute settlement by panels
and the Appellate Body is important too, but most cases are resolved at the
consultation phase, and the benefits of that type of resolution should not be lost.
Wolff responded that the success of the consultation phase in dispute settlement
would not be harmed by creating a standing professional judiciary.
In response to the question of what negotiating leverage countries will have
in the next round, absent a return to unilateralism, Wolff responded that discontent
with the status quo will drive the next round of negotiations. Either multilateralism
must become more effective, or the United States will return to unilateralism or
bilateralism.
V. Success with Small as Opposed to Large Cases
The panelists were asked to comment on the following proposition: the WTO
has dealt well with small cases, but has not done a good job with big cases, such
as Japan-Film.
FALL 1998
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Paemen responded that the problem in Japan-Filmwas the absence of WTO
provisions to deal with conflicting national competition rules. A similar problem
characterized the EU-Beef Hormones case. When the WTO falters, it is due to
the absence of substantive rules.
Katz disagreed that the system has dealt well only with small cases. He observed
that the Oilseeds case was enormous (although it arose under the GATT 1947).
There also may be an inhibition on the part of WTO Members to bring large
cases, but that does not affect the generally positive appraisal of the dispute
settlement system.
Wolff commented that there are big issues on the horizon, including China's
accession to the WTO and the opening of Japan's markets to competition. If the
WTO doesn't cover enough substantive areas, it will not be considered a success.
That is what Congress will look at in 2000. However, one should not dismiss
the significance of the successes thus far.
VI. Dispute Settlement and the Helms-Burton Act
The panelists were asked to comment on the WTO's likely approach to the
Helms-Burton Act if it comes up for dispute settlement.
Katz stated that a dispute over the Helms-Burton Act does not belong in the
WTO. It is in no one's interests to push this dispute to an illogical conclusion.
The trade effects of the Act are, in fact, minimal. It is a terrible law that is hard
to defend. However, it is also easy to exaggerate the law's actual importance.
The dispute settlement system should not be jeopardized over a bad case.
Wolff commented that the Helms-Burton Act is the first in a string of ill-advised
sanctions policies. Some of these sanctions will have a real impact on trade. It
would be wise to resolve disputes over these sanctions outside of the WTO.
However, it is not for the United States to say that it will decide whether to show
up for dispute settlement in Geneva. The United States should show up.
Katz agreed that the United States should show up for dispute settlement over
U.S. sanctions legislation. He added that the United States should also not invoke
national security in response to such disputes. However, it is a mistake for the
European Union to push such disputes to resolution. Katz added that sanctions by
individual states within the United States (such as the sanctions by Massachusetts
directed against Burma) are probably unconstitutional and should be dealt with
in the courts of the United States.
VII. Competition Policy and the Dispute Settlement System
The panelists were asked whether the parties negotiating the WTO Agreements
thought that it would be feasible to deal with a case such as Japan-Filmthrough
the mechanisms established by the DSU.
Katz responded both yes and no. He observed that the United States had declined
to agree to the original Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization,
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in part, because it dealt with private party conduct. Under President Bush, the
United States undertook the Structural Impediments Initiative with Japan, however, which did deal with private party conduct. The United States considers
private party conduct an issue, but not a WTO issue.
Wolff stated that it should be emphasized that in Japan-Film the United
States did not challenge private party conduct. The United States challenged only
measures by the Government of Japan. Article XXIII is designed to cover any
government measures that nullify or impair trade benefits. So, prospectively, it
was designed to cover a case such as Japan-Film.
Paemen stated that private party conduct was not an issue on the agenda at
the beginning of the Uruguay Round. At the signing of the Uruguay Round
Agreements in Marrakesh, Morocco in 1994, trade and competition policy was
listed as a prospective issue to be dealt with by the WTO.

FALL 1998

